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The Political Economy of Central Banking: 
Historical Perspectives
The question of central bank indepen-
dence as we discuss it nowadays has 
been mainly shaped by the theoretical 
debate on rational expectations which 
emerged around 40 years ago, during 
the age of the Great Stagflation. In a 
 famous series of articles published in 
the 1970s, Thomas Sargent and Neil 
Wallace argued that changes in the 
public’s expectations are bound to frus-
trate any attempt of impacting the real 
economy through variations in the 
money supply.1 If Sargent and Wallace 
were right, just the suspicion that mon-
etary authorities might be pursuing 
some kind of nonmonetary target was, 
per se, sufficient to make monetary pol-
icy a useless macroeconomic tool. The 
conclusion which was generally drawn 
from these theoretical findings was that 
monetary policymaking could only be 
credible when monetary and fiscal au-
thorities were clearly separate institu-
tions, pursuing clearly different targets. 
This provided the basis for the doctrine 
of central bank independence, which 
gained widespread popularity in the 
following decades.
The question of the relationship be-
tween monetary and fiscal authorities 
is, however, far older than that. More 
than to pure macroeconomics, it essen-
tially relates to the domain of political 
economy. Political economy is the branch 
of economics which analyzes how the 
interplay among different interest 
groups determines economic policy-
making as well as its distributional ef-
fects. The adoption of a political econ-
omy approach to the study of monetary 
policymaking is legitimate: As a matter 
of fact, central banks are – as any other 
institution – the outcome of some form 
of collective bargaining among differ-
ent interest groups. Therefore, trying 
to relate the evolution of monetary in-
stitutions to the evolution of the social 
contract appears to be a particularly in-
sightful endeavor today, at a time when 
some major changes in the role of cen-
tral banks are suspected to be under-
way.
In order to shed some light on the 
political economy of central banking, it 
is convenient to take a very-long-term 
view on the subject. This means going 
back to a time when central banks as 
we know them today had not appeared 
yet. Although modern central banks 
did not exist before the late 19th cen-
tury, central banking did exist to a cer-
tain extent. Over the centuries, a vari-
ety of different organizations have hap-
pened to perform the same main 
functions central banks do perform 
nowadays – i.e., to ensure a stable value 
of money as well as stability in the fi-
nancial system. Some of these institu-
tions (e.g. early banks of issue) some-
what resembled modern central banks, 
but some others did not. As a matter of 
fact, plenty of alternative arrangements 
have been engineered over time in or-
der to ensure monetary and financial 
1  For a summary of this influential research strand, see Sargent and Wallace (1976).
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stability within domestic banking sys-
tems. Sometimes, such functions were 
provided directly by the government; 
sometimes, they were provided by 
some private intermediary which en-
joyed a predominant market power in 
the domestic payments system; some-
times, they were provided by a special 
corporation which was granted a par-
ticular privilege by government.2 Look-
ing at the way monetary institutions 
gradually crystallized into their current 
form is instructive; In fact, it helps us 
understand to what extent modern cen-
tral banks are the outcome of complex 
historical processes, rather than the 
only viable solution to the demand of 
monetary and financial stability.
How did political economy issues 
actually shape the evolution of mone-
tary institutions, then? To try to an-
swer this question, let us first take a 
microeconomic view and focus on the 
provision of financial stability. The basic 
microeconomic function of central 
banks consists in the management of 
the payments system. The payments sys-
tem is the infrastructure established in 
order to implement transfers of value 
discharging mutual obligations between 
parties. As soon as economies start to 
become sufficiently advanced to entail 
the execution of large payments on a 
regular basis, the demand for the estab-
lishment of such an infrastructure nat-
urally arises. To work properly, a con-
sistent payments system implies the ex-
istence of a central place where all 
transactions are effectively cleared. In 
the early stages, intermediaries will 
typically agree to create a clearing-
house: At the end of each day, all inter-
mediaries adhering to the clearing-
house will discharge mutual obligations 
without having resort to reserve assets. 
However, this kind of solution has his-
torically tended to be unstable. As most 
network businesses, the payments busi-
ness actually appears to be strongly 
subjected to economies of scale: The 
higher the turnover, the lower the 
costs. As a result, what has occurred in 
many different contexts is that a few in-
termediaries – most often, a single one 
– have gradually ended up dominating 
the whole payments system.3 The con-
centration of market power with a sin-
gle intermediary in the clearing process 
is a particularly serious concern. Claims 
on the institution sitting at the center 
of the payments system enjoy a high de-
gree of liquidity: As a result, they natu-
rally tend to assume the status of money 
even though such status is not sanc-
tioned by law. The possible dangers re-
lating to a situation of this kind have 
constantly called for government inter-
vention in this very sensitive sector of 
the economy.
In the light of what precedes, gov-
ernment intervention in the payments 
system can conveniently be seen as reg-
ulation of a natural monopoly – i.e., as 
a question of political economy prop-
erly-speaking, permeated by major dis-
tributional issues. Were rulers sup-
2  For a detailed survey, see Ugolini (2011).
3  A clear exposition of this problem can be found in Goodhart (1988).
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posed to fight such a monopoly power? 
Were they to keep it for themselves? Or 
rather, were they do leave it to a private 
corporation subject to some special 
constraint? All three approaches have 
been adopted by governments in differ-
ent historical circumstances. In some 
cases, regulators have preferred the 
free-market solution and defended the 
clearinghouse system. Yet, the choice 
of breaking down the natural monopoly 
has been the exception rather than the 
rule; It only has prevailed in some par-
ticular contexts in which centralized 
solutions were politically unviable. This 
was the case in decentralized coun- 
tries like the 19th century United States 
of America – where local elites long 
fought the emergence of a national 
banking system.4 Much more often, 
however, governments have kept the 
natural monopoly untouched, and sought 
to take advantage from it. One solution 
has consisted in nationalizing the clear-
ing process and confining it to a state-
owned organization. This was the case 
in city-states like early-modern Venice, 
Amsterdam or Hamburg. In Amster-
dam, for instance, the municipal gov-
ernment founded a public institution 
known as “giro bank” and decreed that 
international payments would be le-
gally enforceable only if cleared via 
the bank’s books. This strict regula-
tory constraint automatically made the 
 Wisselbank the seat of interbank clear-
ing in Amsterdam.5 The alternative so-
lution has consisted in subcontracting 
the management of the natural monop-
oly to a private company. This was the 
case in monarchical states like early-
modern Sweden, England or Austria. 
In England, for instance, the govern-
ment provided the shareholders of a 
bank of issue with the monopoly of 
banknote issuance and joint-stock 
banking in London (the country’s only 
international financial center). The 
“privilege” was only granted for a lim-
ited period of time and the deal had 
to be renegotiated at expiration, but 
the solution was effective in estab-
lishing the Bank of England as the seat 
of interbank clearing for the whole 
country.6
Therefore, the structural features 
of domestic political systems have been 
crucial in determining the way pay-
ments systems have been organized in 
different times and places. Changes in 
the organization of payments systems 
have coincided with major changes in 
the balance of power – e.g. the rise of 
the federal government in the United 
States; the fall of the municipal govern-
ment in Amsterdam; or the gradual de-
mocratization of English society.
Let us now abandon a microeco-
nomic viewpoint and look at the very 
same facts from a macroeconomic per-
spective. This means focusing on the pro-
vision of monetary stability. The basic 
macroeconomic function of central banks 
is money creation. Central bank money 
consists of sight liabilities of the organi-
zation standing at the center of the pay-
ments system: To make a parallel with 
sovereign debt, we can say that these 
sight liabilities – which actually corre-
spond to central bank “debts” – can be 
either “inscribed” (it is the case with 
deposits) or “securitized” (it is the case 
with banknotes). Strictly speaking, 
central bank money is issued only when 
the bank’s liabilities exceed its reserves 
of gold or foreign currency – i.e., when 
the central bank engages into “frac-
tional reserve banking” in order to buy 
4  Timberlake (1993).
5  Gillard (2004).
6  Broz and Grossman (2004).
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some non-reserve asset. Here, the cru-
cial question is to know why money is 
issued – or, to put it differently, what is 
the counterpart to money creation. 
Once more, it is a political economy 
question with non-negligible distribu-
tional consequences. If the counterpart 
to money creation is dubious, holders of 
money – who are, in fact, creditors to 
the central bank – are exposed to the 
risk of being confiscated a considerable 
portion of their purchasing power.
American humorist Will Rogers is 
credited to have once jokingly said: 
“There have been three great inven-
tions since the beginning of time: fire, 
the wheel, and central banking.” No 
doubt, this joke has a lot of truth in it. 
Indeed, money creation is an extremely 
powerful instrument: It is, potentially, 
one of the most efficient means to per-
form wealth redistribution. This is why 
it is easily prone to abuses. The prob-
lem, then, is to find a way to convince 
potential “creditors” that the instru-
ment will not be abused, so that they 
will “stay” the market and hold central 
bank money instead of other assets. 
Historically, different kinds of equilib-
ria have been found between those sit-
ting on the liabilities side of the central 
bank’s balance sheet (the holders of 
money) and those sitting on its assets 
side (the recipients of central bank 
credit). To illustrate this, let us just fo-
cus on the two early types of money-is-
suing organizations that we have al-
ready mentioned: giro banks and banks 
of issue.7
As we have previously said, giro 
banks (e.g. Amsterdam’s Wisselbank) 
were state-owned institutions bearing 
the monopoly of legal interbank pay-
ments. Besides enjoying this valuable 
privilege, they had no capital endow-
ment and were not subject to any strict 
limit in their money creation. How were 
institutions with such an enormous dis-
cretionary power able to attract the 
confidence of potential money-holders? 
The fact is that the model of giro banks 
was adopted in city states like early-
modern Venice, Amsterdam, or Ham-
burg. In these international financial 
centers, the government was in the 
hands of an oligarchy of bankers and 
tradesmen who also were the main us-
ers of the payments infrastructure. 
This means that the main creditors to 
the giro bank basically coincided with 
its main debtor – which was, of course, 
the State.8 As a result, there was no risk 
that the State would, one day, indulge 
into money creation to fund enterprises 
whose aims conflicted with their own 
interests. This worked as a guarantee 
that money creation would not be sys-
tematically used to confiscate money-
holders’ purchasing power: as such, it 
played a role in widening the popular-
ity of central bank money to agents that 
did not have a stake into the oligarchic 
government.
The situation was very different in 
monarchies like early-modern Sweden, 
England, or Austria. There, the poten-
tial creditors to the money-issuing in-
stitution (i.e., bankers and tradesmen) 
did not coincide with its main debtor 
(i.e., the State). In this context, the 
problem consisted of finding an equi-
librium which would – on the one hand 
– allow the monarchic government to 
monetize debt and – on the other hand 
– guarantee money-holders that they 
would not be systematically confiscated 
their purchasing power. Banks of issue 
were created as a solution to this prob-
lem. As we have previously recalled, a 
bank of issue (e.g. the early Bank of 
7  More details are available in Ugolini (2011).
8  Gillard (2004).
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England) was a privately-owned com-
pany to which the government “subcon-
tracted” the management of a certain 
monopoly for a given period of time. 
The shareholders of the bank were free 
to make use of this monopolistic power 
to their own advantage for the entire 
duration of the subcontracting deal, but 
at a cost. First, they had to pay down 
immediately a given amount of capital 
(i.e. the stock capital of the company), 
which would be mainly lent to the gov-
ernment. Second, they had to face 
some constraints to money creation – 
typically embodied by the requirement 
to assure gold or silver convertibility of 
banknotes.9 As a result, the deal be-
tween the government and the share-
holders was based on a system of mu-
tual limitations to the discretionary 
power of each party; these guarantees 
proved effective in widening the popu-
larity of central bank money to agents 
that did not have a stake into the mo-
narchic government or into the com-
pany itself.
Many things have changed substan-
tially since the early-modern era. Old 
banks of issue (like the Bank of Eng-
land) have come across major transfor-
mations of their corporate structure 
and their position with respect to fiscal 
authorities. It is fair to say that these 
mutations have largely coincided with 
shifts in the balance of power between 
different interest groups – shifts which 
have been mostly connected to big ex-
ternal shocks. The fragile equilibrium 
between creditors and debtors to cen-
tral banks has typically been over-
turned by wartime inflations, often as-
sociated with a redrafting of the social 
contract previously in force. Such re-
shuffles have often implied the termi-
nation of earlier monetary arrange-
ments: This was, for instance, the case 
of giro banks, which disappeared to-
gether with the city-states they had 
been associated to.
Let us try to sum up the implica-
tions of this brief historical overview of 
the political economy of central bank-
ing. In the light of our findings, the 
question of the relationship between 
monetary and fiscal authorities seems 
to be more complex than the recent de-
bate on central bank independence 
would suggest. In the simple frame-
work inspired by Sargent’s and Wal-
lace’s theoretical contributions, the 
recipe for establishing an untarnished 
confidence in central bank money con-
sisted in severing all links between 
 governments and central bankers. In 
reality, however, monetary and fiscal 
authorities can hardly be separated at 
all: in fact, they are the two sides of the 
same coin – which is, the modern state. 
On the one hand, central banks would 
hardly survive in the absence of a solid 
political backing: the opportunity to 
create money depends on the circum-
stance of being at the center of the pay-
ments system, and this is a legal privi-
lege whose fate depends on the one of 
the political regime which has granted 
it. On the other hand, advanced fiscal 
systems would hardly survive in the ab-
9  Broz and Grossman (2004).
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sence of a full-fledged payments system 
and of an efficient mechanism for the 
absorption of government deficits: 
These conditions can only be ensured 
by the existence of a widely-trusted 
agency capable of monetizing debt in a 
sustainable way. The idea that mone-
tary and fiscal authorities can live their 
lives oblivious of each other does not 
seem to be validated by historical evi-
dence: And in fact, the recent appear-
ance of the very first fiscal troubles in 
forty years has sufficed to put this con-
cept under severe strain in most devel-
oped countries.
Under many respects, the architec-
ture of the Eurosystem was originally 
conceived as an incarnation of this 
once-fashionable “principle of separa-
tion”. The crisis begun in 2007 has seri-
ously questioned the philosophy under-
lying the whole project. As a matter of 
fact, it is now generally admitted that at 
the roots of the euro area crisis lay a 
number of major distributional prob-
lems. In a rather dismissive way, most 
commentators have depicted such prob-
lems as specific to the peculiarities of a 
monetary union. Sure, the special 
structure of the Eurosystem has been 
responsible for making distributional 
issues emerge in a particularly spectac-
ular fashion. However, history suggests 
that these are universal features of cen-
tral banking, inevitably resurfacing in 
any time and place. If this is true, the 
belief that monetary and fiscal troubles 
can be solved separately is a great delu-
sion – and a potentially dangerous one. 
The legitimacy of monetary and fiscal 
authorities rests on the very same foun-
dations; should inability to address 
these troubles imperil the social con-
tract, neither authority could reason-
ably expect to survive the fall of the 
other one.
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